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A LANDMARK DECISION TURNS FORTY: A
CONVERSATION ON BUCKLEY V. VALEO
Nicholas W. Allard*
President, Joseph Crea Dean and Professor of Law
Today we gather to observe—I will not say celebrate—the
fortieth anniversary of Buckley v. Valeo,1 a landmark case
remarkable for its impact, and frankly for lasting so long. Today’s
program, organized by professor Joel Gora and featuring our
exceptionally distinguished special guest speakers, is further proof
of what has long been the case; that our great law school is a leading
center for learning how to use the power of law to good effect for
people and for society at home and abroad. Perhaps you will
understand, and share with me, the great pride I feel as the President
and Dean of Brooklyn Law School, as once again our law school
takes on issues which are paramount; issues whose significance
matters far beyond our campus, our city, and the empire state.
Understanding Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny and studying
election campaign finance law is critical to address pressing
questions about liberty, freedom, equality, and the very legitimacy
of our democratic republic.
Our political election system is in shambles. Its damaged
condition and disarray makes me think about the havoc in a trailer
park after a tornado. And like the harm suffered in those terrible
natural disasters, the destructive man-made wind fanned by dollars,
distrust, and partisan distemper threatens the very foundation of our
system of government. In order for our democracy to endure we will
need more than a superficial cleanup and more than merely
attempting to resume business as usual after each stormy election
subsides. We need a selfless, collective, public-spirited effort, and
* Remarks given at the “A Landmark Decision Turns Forty: A Decision on
Buckley v. Valeo” event on January 26, 2016.
1
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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we need to rebuild and strengthen our institutions on sound and safe
ground. We need to be forward-looking, taking into account the
climate change buffeting contemporary politics brought on, for
example, by the dawn of a new age of mobile broadband
campaigning and fundraising that soon will eclipse conventional
broadcast media, and by electoral districting and primary systems
that seem to be reinforcing polarization, gridlock, and dysfunction
in government. The last thing we need to do is put Band-Aids on
yesterday’s problems, when in fact new challenges are upon us.
So, before we turn to the gospel of Buckley v. Valeo according
to James, Ira, and Joel, I will invoke two readings from scripture.
First, from the “Old Testament,” the Federalist Papers: “If [people]
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern [people], neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.”2
The lesson of this reading is that, as we consider campaign
finance reform issues, we should keep our eye on the ball; that is to
say that elections are a means to the desired end of good
government—government that is of the people, by the people, and
for the people—responsible to them and limited by them. That is our
ultimate purpose and today’s program is but a start, and will nicely
set up what outside commentators have already described as
possibly the most significant discussion of such issues that will
occur in America this year—a free speech symposium at Brooklyn
Law School organized by Professor Joel Gora, Judge Andrew
Napolitano, and our exceptional constitutional law faculty for
February 26, 2016—Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the
First Amendment.
My reading from the “New Testament” is Justice Brandeis’ great
dissent in Olmsted v. United States:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes
are beneficent. [People] born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty

2

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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lurk in insidious encroachment by [people] of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.3
The lesson I take from this extraordinary passage is that it is not
enough to assume and presume that one’s cause is just, that one side
or the other on the campaign finance debate has a monopoly of
righteousness. We need to learn and to study all the facts, and
discover what the root causes of our problems are. We must take
care—especially because much is at stake—that our remedies are
not worse than the disease. First, do no harm.
Specifically, in my personal view, the evils of corruption and
tyranny that drove the advocates of the Federal Election Campaign
Act and its amendments, and that motivated and drove the Buckley
v. Valeo litigation, are indeed evils which are anathema to our way
of life. But, in reality, corruption and tyranny are well guarded
against in our system under current law and are less problematic than
are the problems of asymmetry, which is to say inequality in the
ability to participate and to be heard; partisan dysfunction, which
sadly requires no elaboration to this audience at this time; and waste,
which is to say that our campaigns are too long, too expensive, and
too uninformative to do any damn good, and moreover that the
biggest scandal is that politicians are compelled, or feel compelled,
to spend their time and attention raising money in never-ending
campaigns rather than doing their jobs and governing once elected.
The good news is that the fresh ground we can cover together
pursuing solutions to these real problems could prove fertile, and I
sincerely believe improvement is possible.
Turning to Buckley v. Valeo itself, it is an exceptional case—a
143-page per curiam behemoth with 178 footnotes, five separate
opinions of the eight justices involved, writing eighty-three more
pages, which with appendices yielded a 294-page reported decision.
By 2010, the year of the Citizens United decision,4 Buckley v. Valeo
already had been cited approximately in 2,500 cases, 4,000 law
review articles, and has been consistently cited in cases both

3

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(holding political spending is protected speech under the First Amendment).
4
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upholding campaign finance laws and in some cases overturning
them.5
So, questions I suspect our speakers will delve into today will
include:
 Is the impact of Buckley v. Valeo what you expected?
 What explains its impact and staying power?
 Can we do better?
 If so, what do you recommend?
I am sure that we can leave some in-depth analysis of these questions
until our upcoming free speech symposium in February. For now, I
will conclude by referring to the actual Bible by citing Numbers and
simply asking: “[w]hat hath God wrought?”6
In modern America, we too have been wandering in the
wilderness now for forty years—and it is about time we find our way
to a better place. Despite my dark opening comment about the reality
of the terrible conditions of our broken election and campaign
finance system, I remain an optimist, and with good reason. I have
confidence, which our country’s history repeatedly demonstrates is
warranted—confidence in the resilience and powerful selfcorrecting mechanisms built into our brilliantly designed,
cantilevered system of government and confidence in the
fundamental good nature and spirit of the American people.

5

See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (using
Buckley as instructive to determine § 319 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(2002) to be unconstitutional); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93,
103–05 (2003) (using Buckley reasoning to constitutionally validate parts of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) and invalidate others); Jeremiah W.
Nixon & Paul R. Maguffee, Money Talks: In Defense of a Common-Sense
Approach to Judicial Review of Campaign Contribution Limits, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 661 (2000) (discussing how “the United States Supreme Court embraced
such a common-sense understanding of the risks posed by large campaign
contributions”); Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the
First Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71 (1999) (discussing how the Supreme
Court in Buckley “established the campaign and political disclosure framework
for campaign finance jurisprudence”).
6
Numbers 23:23.

A LANDMARK DECISION TURNS FORTY: A
CONVERSATION ON BUCKLEY V. VALEO
James L. Buckley
I am delighted to be part of this commemoration of the fortieth
anniversary of Buckley v. Valeo,1 and not just because it has assured
me a measure of immortality. Although the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case was flawed in one important respect,2 it warrants
celebration because of the Court’s critical holding that campaign
spending is constitutionally protected speech.3
Buckley challenged the constitutionality of the Campaign
Reform Act of 1974,4 which, among other things, placed ceilings on
what could be spent in presidential and congressional campaigns,

1

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 28–29 (holding that a $1,000 contribution ceiling for individual
campaign contributions was constitutional to limit corruption and the appearance
of corruption).
3
Id. at 51–58.
4
Id. at 7 (challenging, among others, the following provisions: individual
political contributions limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with
an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent
expenditures by individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate”
limited to $ 1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various federal
offices and spending for national conventions by political parties subject to
prescribed limits; and disclosure requirements for contributions and expenditures
above certain threshold levels); Campaign Reform Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.93443, § 3044, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
2

15

16

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

and also limited individual campaign contributions to $1,000 per
candidate,5 a figure that has since grown to $2,700.6
When the legislation came to the Senate floor, I felt its
restrictions on challengers were constitutionally suspect; that they
were very bad policy, and I vigorously opposed them. So, when the
legislation was enacted into law the only recourse was to test its
constitutionality in court. And in this noble enterprise I was joined
by a half-dozen or so enlightened co-plaintiffs.
At the outset, it is instructive to look at the diverse plaintiffs in
Buckley. What we had in common was not ideology, but our status
as political outsiders. Although I was a U.S. senator at the time, I
had squeaked into office four years earlier as a third-party candidate.
My co-plaintiffs included former Senator Eugene McCarthy, who in
1968 had bucked his party’s establishment by running a presidential
primary campaign effective enough to cause Lyndon Johnson to
withdraw his candidacy for reelection. Other plaintiffs included the
very conservative American Conservative Union, the equally liberal
New York Civil Liberties Union, and Mr. Stewart Mott, a wealthy
sponsor of liberal causes who had contributed $220,000 to the
McCarthy presidential campaign.7
What we all had in common was a concern that the 1974 Act
would effectively squeeze independent voices and reform
movements out of the political process by making it even more
difficult than it already was to raise effective challenges to the
political status quo. We believed that the Act’s restrictions were
fundamentally flawed, both constitutionally and as a matter of
public policy.
The core value protected by the First Amendment’s speech
clause is the freedom of political speech.8 It is incontrovertible that
in today’s world it takes money, and a great deal of it, for political
5

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6, 29 (“[T]he weighty interests served by restricting
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify
the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000
contribution ceiling.”).
6
Campaign Reform Act, § 3044; see Citizens’ Guide, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens.shtml#how_much (last
updated Feb. 2017).
7
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7–8; see 147 CONG. REC. S3, 4001 (Mar. 2001).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

A LANDMARK DECISION TURNS FORTY

17

speech to be heard. Therefore, we opposed the limits on
contributions and spending as unlawful. We found the legislation
equally objectionable as a matter of policy, because a healthy
democracy should encourage competition in the political
marketplace rather than increase the difficulties already faced by
those challenging incumbents, all of whom enjoy such enormous
advantages as name recognition, automatic access to the media, and
the good will generated by handling constituent problems.
Given this fundamental political reality, a challenger who is not
a celebrity in his or her own right must be able to persuade both the
media and a broad base of potential contributors that his or her
candidacy is credible. This requires a substantial amount of seed
money. As I testified in the case, I could not have won election in
1970 if the $1,000 limit on individual contributions had been in
place.9 Thanks to about $60,000 in gifts from a handful of
individuals, my campaign was able at the outset to hire key
personnel, print campaign literature, and rent strategically located
space in New York City for my headquarters.
This caused the media to take my candidacy seriously, and that
in turn enabled me to raise—largely through means of mailings—
the two million required for a competitive campaign. Nor could
Senator McCarthy have launched a serious challenge to an
incumbent president without the more than one million he received
from a dozen early supporters.
In Buckley, we won a number of our arguments before the
Supreme Court but lost a critical one. The Court agreed that the
restrictions placed on what could be spent in political campaigns
were unconstitutional.10 It held, however, that the limitations placed
on individual contributions were constitutional because of
Congress’s express concern of avoiding the fact or appearance of
corruption in federal elections.11 But, because of the understandable
assumption that an individual cannot corrupt himself, the Court

9

See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (1975) (testimony of Hon. James
Buckley); accord JAMES L. BUCKLEY, FREEDOM AT RISK 182 (2010).
10
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
11
Id. at 45.
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overturned the limits that Congress had placed on what candidates
could spend on their own campaigns.12
In the wake of the Buckley decision, we are left with a package
of federal election laws and regulations that have distorted virtually
every aspect of the election process. The 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act were supposed to deemphasize the
role of money in federal elections. Instead, the limit on individual
contributions has made the search for money a candidate’s central
preoccupation.
When I ran in 1970, I never made telephone calls requesting
money, and I doubt that I attended as many as a half-dozen
fundraising occasions. Passing the hat was the exclusive concern of
my finance committee. Today, from the moment they take office,
members of Congress routinely spend an hour or two on the phone
every day soliciting contributions for their future reelection
campaigns. Federal campaign regulations have virtually driven
grassroots action from the political scene. The rules have become
too complex; the costs of a misstep too great.
In 1970, when on campaign tours around New York State, I
would often run into groups that, on their own initiative, had rented
storefronts from which to dispense my campaign literature, man the
phones, and dispatch volunteers. Today, anyone intrepid enough to
engage in that sort of spontaneous activity must hire a lawyer, and
even then, they must be prepared to prove in court that they were
acting independently of their candidate’s campaign.
Today’s reformers complain about the power of political action
committees—the notorious PACs—and they do so with substantial
justification. Those committees can have very specific legislative
objectives and they may condition contributions on a candidate’s
commitment to vote this way or that in future legislation. But their
proliferation and growth are a direct consequence of the restrictions
placed on individual giving. A citizen who would have contributed
a substantial amount to a candidate in whom he believes, but is today
limited to $2,700, will find other outlets for the rest of the money he
has earmarked for political purposes. The PACs provide a ready
alternative.

12

Id. at 52–53, 58.
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There is general agreement that the current law governing
federal campaigns is worse than unsatisfactory.13 The answer,
however, is not to place further restrictions on the freedom of
speech, as so many continue to urge,14 but rather to reexamine the
premises on which the existing ones have been based. In the first
instance, it has been amply demonstrated in a dozen races that
money itself cannot buy elections. The voters have the final say. But
what money can, and must, do is buy the minimum exposure without
which no candidate, however meritorious, has a chance.
Second, while it is of course true that large contributions can
corrupt, the likelihood that a candidate will be seduced by them is
vastly overstated. The overwhelming majority of wealthy donors
back candidates in whom they believe and with whom they are in
general agreement, and they are far more tolerant of differences on
this point or that than are the PACs or other single-issue
organizations to which a candidate must otherwise turn for
necessary financing.
Corruption only occurs when a legislator casts a vote that
violates his convictions in exchange for financial support, and
studies of actual voting patterns suggest that kind of corruption is
far too rare to warrant the distortions created by the present law in
an attempt to avoid the appearances of corruption.15
However, this is not to deny the importance of minimizing such
appearances. Our current law addresses the problem by requiring a
timely disclosure of all contributions over a specific amount.16 That
enables opponents to publicize any gift that might give rise to an
adverse inference, and the public can then judge whether the
contribution in fact is apt to corrupt the recipient.
I long supported that safeguard, but thanks to a recent dissent by
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas from the Court’s holding
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that disclosures
13

See, e.g., E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING
(1998).
14
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81.
15
See BRADLEY A. SMITH, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: FAULTY
ASSUMPTIONS AND UNDEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES, CATO INST. (Sept. 13,
1995), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa238.pdf.
16
52 U.S.C. § 30104 (2015).

THE JUDICIAL STRONGHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
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of contributions are constitutional under the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act,17 I believe that there may be a better way to
deal with this matter.
In his opinion, Justice Thomas described in chilling detail the
organized harassment of individuals who had made contributions in
support of a California referendum that would define marriage as a
union between a man and a woman.18 He then concluded that he
could not “endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects
citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or
defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening warning letters as
the price for engaging in ‘core political speech, the primary object
of our First Amendment protection.’”19
I am no longer sure that I can either, especially given the power
of today’s social media to mobilize instant retaliation. I therefore
believe that Congress should consider legislation to delete the limits
on individual giving, while requiring that all contributions be made
anonymously. This could be done by requiring that they be routed
through a neutral third party such as a bank. To ensure anonymity,
however, the law would have to impose a serious penalty such as
mandatory prison time for any disclosure of a contribution’s source.
But, whether one discloses contributions or requires their
anonymity, what makes no sense is to retain a set of rules that makes
it impossible for a Stewart Mott to provide a Eugene McCarthy with
the seed money essential to a credible challenge to a sitting
president, or that makes politics the playground of the super-rich
who can finance their own campaigns.
I recognize that congressional incumbents will instinctively
resist my suggestion because the elimination of campaign
contribution limits would make it easier for challengers to unseat
them. Nevertheless, their liberation from the odious chore of daily
pleas for money might incline them to oblige me. But, only then will
the Buckley v. Valeo plaintiffs be able to claim a total victory.

17

(2010).
18

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369–71

Id. at 481–82 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 485 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 264
(2003)).
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A LANDMARK DECISION TURNS FORTY: A
CONVERSATION ON BUCKLEY V. VALEO
Ira Glasser
I was struck, as I always am, by Dean Allard’s reference to Judge
Brandeis’s line from Olmstead v. United States about how we
should beware of men of zeal, well-intentioned but without
understanding.1 Nothing provides a better aphorism for our subject
today than that.
I also want to remind us that we are talking here about remedies.
We are not arguing about the problem. It is a great mistake in public
policy and in legislation to focus with almost hyperbolic intensity
and near exclusivity on the nature of a problem, so that people get
so excited about how terrible this problem is that they proceed to
enact and support remedies that have no bearing on the problem, and
may make it worse or create other problems that did not exist before.
There are numerous examples. In the 1970s and 1980s, rising
crime was a big problem, so former U.S. Attorney General Edwin
Meese proposed to get rid of the exclusionary rule and the Miranda
warning.2 And people bought that because they were so excited
about the problem that they failed to notice that getting rid of those
rights, (A) would have no effect on solving the problem; and (B)

1

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
See Yale Kamisar, The Case of Meese vs. Miranda: His Attacks Speak to
His Constituency, Not to the Law, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1987),
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-02-11/local/me-1562_1_miranda-ruling;
Associated Press, Meese Hopes to Eliminate Evidence Exclusionary Rule, L.A.
TIMES (May 7, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-05-07/news/mn11122_1_exclusionary-rule; see also State-by-State and National Crime
Estimates
by
Year(s),
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS,
https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm (demonstrating the
rise in crime rates in the United States under the United States total, violent crime
rates, and property crime rates from the years of 1970 to 1989).
2
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would create new problems by getting rid of rights that were very
important to have.
Alcoholism was a problem in the early twentieth century that
was of runaway proportions. But Prohibition was not the solution.
Not only did this remedy not solve the problem, it created an
immense range of other problems: it increased crime, it increased
violence, it violated rights. The “War on Drugs” only repeated that
mistake, and it is still with us.
So, what you always have to look at when you are dealing with
a problem is not just the severity of the problem, but also whether
the proposed remedy will solve the problem and whether it will,
unintentionally or not, create new and perhaps even worse problems.
The problem here is inequality of speech resulting from an
inequality of wealth. That is a problem that has been with us for a
long time. Thomas Jefferson was hardly a man of the working class.
And I grew up in New York where the names of the governors were
Lehman, Roosevelt, Harriman, Dewey, and Rockefeller. With the
exception of Dewey, those four governors were what you might
today call part of the one percent. I daresay they had more speech
than my father, who was a construction worker with a fifth-grade
education, and they certainly had more access to the political
system. And that has always been true. Whoever owned the Times
had a lot more speech than I did or the people who owned The
Nation did.
So, inequality of wealth has always led to inequality of speech,
and that has been a distortion and a problem in how democracy
works, no question about it. But the solution that campaign finance
advocates and the laws that they succeeded in passing, the remedy
that they proposed, was to give the government the power to restrict
speech in order to equalize it. That was their theory.
The first time that power was used by the government under
campaign finance legislation was against these three bedraggled
people who wandered into my office at the New York Civil Liberties
Union (“NYCLU”) early one day in 1972. In addition to people with
real civil liberties problems, we were always getting people who
were half-crazy walking in wanting to be clients, and therefore, we
had to decide whether to just gently lead them out, or listen further
to what they were saying. And even if we thought they were crazy,
that did not mean they were not having their rights violated.

A LANDMARK DECISION TURNS FORTY
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These three people and their story at first sounded a little bizarre.
And I remember thinking how old they were—but they were
probably about as old as I am now. And one of them, the one that
had the money to pay for an advertisement they had published and
wanted to publish again, came in with his shirt wide open and was
half-naked. They came walking in, and they were carrying on about
the secret bombing of Cambodia and the war in Vietnam, and how
this was all unconstitutional because the war was being fought
without Congressional authorization.3
And they thought that this was a basis for impeachment, so they
paid for and ran this almost unreadable two-page advertisement in
the New York Times. It had a list of “honor rolls” of people in
Congress who had voted for resolutions against the war. They had
“dishonor rolls” of people who had supported the war. They
attacked Nixon. They attacked Kissinger. This was early 1972. I
remember seeing it. I looked at it. I rolled my eyes a little bit at it
and turned to the sports pages.
And so why were they in my office? They were there because
the U.S. government had gone into federal court in the Eastern
District and gotten an injunction prohibiting them from publishing
that ad again and threatening the Times from ever accepting an ad
like that again, under penalty of criminal prosecution.
So, I listened and I thought, well, that cannot be. This was a clear
First Amendment issue; the government was trying to suppress
dissent, and surely the courts cannot allow that. So I read the
injunction, and it cited this statute, which I had never heard of, called
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).4 And the
statute provided a remedy for unequal speech in politics by saying
that if anybody published an ad that praised a candidate for federal
election, or was in derogation of that candidate’s opponent, they

3

For a fuller discussion of the circumstances surrounding this advertisement,
see United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1143–47 (2d
Cir. 1972).
4
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat.
3 (1971) (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146); FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
FEDERAL
ELECTION
CAMPAIGN
LAWS
(2015),
http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf.
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could not do so without the money that they were spending counting
against the limits of campaign spending by the favored candidate.5
So now the candidate, who knew nothing about this ad, had to
either certify that the ad was his and have its cost count against the
spending limits imposed by the new law or renounce the ad, or else
it could not be published. So, it meant that a group of citizens who
had the money to buy the speech could not exercise their speech.
The speech at issue was criticism of a president and the conduct of
a war in an election year. And if there was anything that the founders
of this country meant to protect when they passed the First
Amendment, it was that sort of speech on that sort of issue at that
sort of time.
So, we represented them on appeal. We went into court—the
case was called National Committee for Impeachment v. United
States,6 I think—and we won in the Second Circuit. And I thought,
okay, that is it. We slapped them around, and that is the end of that.
That kind of stuff was happening all the time where public officials
would step out of line, and you win the case, and it’s over.
But later that same year, in September of 1972, shortly before
National Committee for Impeachment was decided, we tried to
publish an ad in the Times in the form of an open letter to President
Nixon, criticizing him for opposing school busing for the purposes
of racial integration. He had been a vigorous opponent of such
school busing, and we were a vigorous supporter of it. So, we
published this ad in the form of an open letter to him, criticizing him
and urging him to change his position. We also listed an “honor roll”
of members of Congress who supported our position.
I did not think there was going to be any problem with that. The
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) never got involved in
elections—we were barred by our own bylaws from ever taking a
position for or against an electoral candidate, and we never had. Nor
did we in our open letter. Criticizing public officials on civil liberties

5

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 52
U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146, invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 51 (invalidating parts of the statute placing
ceilings on campaign finance that impose a “substantial restraint on the ability of
persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression”).
6
Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135.
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issues is what we did. That was our mission. And that was what most
organizations like us did on whatever issues defined their missions.
So, we submitted the ad to the Times. We raised some money for
it, we submitted it to the Times, and we got a letter back from the
Times saying they could not publish the ad. And they could not
publish the ad because, in the National Committee on Impeachment
case, they were threatened with criminal prosecution if they ever ran
such an ad again. They had this threatening letter in their files. Their
lawyers told them they had better not do it.
So, we had a meeting with the general counsel of the Times, and
we said, we are going to sue, because the result of this is we cannot
speak. We cannot get our position in the paper. We do not own the
paper, so we have to buy the space. We are lucky enough to be able
to buy the space, we have the money to buy the space, but we cannot
buy the space. So, you could write an editorial like this and be
protected by the First Amendment, but we cannot buy the space to
say the same thing you could say in your editorial because of the
government’s threat to you that you will be criminally prosecuted if
you sell us the space!
They agreed that if we filed that lawsuit, they would file an
amicus brief on our behalf, and that is what happened. That case was
called ACLU v. Jennings,7 and we won that case too. So that was the
second time within a year that the use of the campaign finance laws
had been struck down. And these were the first two, and to my
knowledge at that time, the only two applications of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.8 Not against big corrupt money
people, but against groups of citizens exercising precisely the right
of speech, at precisely the time it was intended to be particularly
effective, that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
So, we won that case, and in the course of these two cases, we
discovered by the arguments against us that the theory of the
Campaign Finance Act was that any speech that praised a candidate
or was critical of a candidate might affect how people voted. Even
7

American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041
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if there was no advocacy for or against the election. Even if it was
just issue speech, which is all that the ACLU did, or those three
people who walked into my office six months earlier had done. It
might affect the election, the government said, and therefore the
money could not be spent on speech without all of the restrictions
that were built into the Campaign Finance Act.
And from the beginning, at its roots, the original sin of campaign
finance advocacy was the notion that any speech in an election year
on an issue that was critical of or praiseworthy of a candidate for
federal election might affect how people voted. That, if somebody
saw our ad criticizing President Nixon for his position on school
integration, it might cause them to vote against him. Therefore, it
was construed as a campaign act instead of as free speech.
They kept passing these things in new forms, and we kept
striking them down. And this has gone on now for almost fifty years.
A lot of the provisions that were at stake in the McCain-Feingold
Act were different versions of the same thing. The limitations
against speech by corporations, people have had in mind, “oh,
they’re limiting corporate speech, that’s a great thing. We don’t
want Exxon and J.P. Morgan Chase affecting our elections.” Well,
in fact those sorts of corporations do not spend money on campaign
speech. So, who spends money on campaign speech? Other
corporations, like the ACLU Incorporated. Like the NAACP
Incorporated. And yes, like Citizens United Incorporated. And not
campaign speech in the sense of advocating for a candidate’s
election or defeat, but campaign speech in the sense of speaking out
on issues during an election campaign.
Those were the corporations that ended up being limited and
threatened by the legislation. Did it affect the money in electoral
speech? No. Has the money in politics gotten worse or better in the
last forty or fifty years during the time these campaign finance laws
have reigned? It has gotten worse. Has inequality been reduced in
electoral advocacy or has it been increased? It has been increased,
for reasons that have nothing to do with the exercise of free speech.
What Judge Buckley was saying about Eugene McCarthy was
exactly right. He became a big advocate of our position because of
what had happened to him. He was running a quixotic campaign.
When he started his primary campaign in New Hampshire, he went
into that primary as part of an anti-war effort to turn incumbent
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Lyndon B. Johnson around. And when he started that campaign, he
was, you know, this guy from Minnesota. Nobody ever heard of him
in New Hampshire. He had 2 percent name recognition and no
money. Well, if you have 2 percent name recognition and no money,
how do you run a campaign in New Hampshire? You don’t.
And so he ended up having, I think initially it was just three
people who were giving him high six-figure or seven-figure
contributions, all of which would be a crime today, even under the
Buckley decision. And who needs money in that kind of a campaign?
It is precisely the insurgent who is not known.
How do you get the money? If the incumbents want to beat you,
they make you collect it in small chunks because that is almost
impossible to do. And you need money to raise money. If you are
going to use direct mail to raise money in small chunks, you need
millions of dollars to fund a direct mail campaign. If you are going
to do television advertising, you need money. There was no Internet
back then.
The insurgents are the ones who need money. The incumbents
do not need anywhere near as much money. They have the name
recognition. They have the franking privilege. They have the ability
to call a news conference and make news because they are already
elected. The insurgents always are the ones who do not have name
recognition, do not have the visibility, and cannot be heard. They
are the ones who need the big gifts. Without the big gifts they cannot
get started.
So, McCarthy gets these three large contributions—
contributions that would be a crime today, and since 1971. He buys
time in New Hampshire. He gets known. He ends up coming so
close in the primary campaign. He did not beat Johnson, but he got
so close that Johnson shortly thereafter announced that he would not
seek reelection. And the whole tenor of politics and the war in
Vietnam changes, which was after all Senator McCarthy’s goal.
If the current campaign finance restrictions, even after the
Buckley decision, were in place, McCarthy never gets off the
ground. No liberal in America objected to McCarthy’s campaign at
the time. All of the people who are against big money now, who
carry on about Citizens United v. FEC,9 were the ones who
9
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supported the Eugene McCarthy campaign then. Always beware of
whose ox is gored.
As Judge Buckley said, what united the strange bedfellows in
the Buckley case was that they were all outsiders.10 They were all
insurgents from different political points of view running against the
establishment. That is what united them. And they were all
discriminated against by campaign finance laws.
Professor Joel Gora, once early in his tenure at the ACLU, and
Professor Bradley A. Smith have called FECA and the amendments
of 1974, the “Incumbent’s Protection Act.”11 It was that then, and it
has been that ever since. And incumbency has increased during the
forty or fifty years of campaign finance legislation. So has the
inequality of campaign speech, so has the inequality of money, so
has the inequality of speech in general. The remedies of the
campaign finance laws have not worked on their own terms; they
have made the problem worse. They have constantly been used by
the government to attack speech that was not even an intended target
of campaign finance laws.
So, when you look back at the Buckley case and what we did,
that was the reason. We had won a few cases before, but they just
kept coming. And so, the Buckley v. Valeo12 litigation was an
attempt to comprehensively, finally knock this thing out and
reestablish the First Amendment. And if you were going to deal with
the issue of inequality of speech and money in politics, you had to
find a different way to do it. Maybe public financing, maybe giving
candidates the franking privilege so that they had it as well as the
incumbents. Maybe lots of things. Maybe deal with the tax structure
so that the inequality of money did not go so much further out of
control as it did.

10
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But the radicals who might be dealing with the inequality of the
tax structure would rather deal with suppressing the speech of the
ACLU, the NAACP, and Citizens United. What Citizens United did
when it made that film attacking Hillary Clinton13 could have been
what we might have done in making a film attacking positions taken
by George Bush. But because it was a right-wing group attacking a
liberal, most liberals thought that this was speech they would rather
not see.
Finally, the one thing one has to remember about all of this is
that the fight over the McCain-Feingold Act, which is the successor
fight to what started with Buckley, only related to speech on radio
and television. If the Court had ruled differently in Citizens United
than it did,14 and upheld the constitutionality of those restrictions,
the government would have gained the power to ban a book.
That question was directly asked of the government during the
Supreme Court argument: if you could ban a film critical of Hillary
Clinton in an election year, could you ban a book critical of her?
Could you ban a book that praised her? Could you ban her own
book? The answer to all of those questions that the government gave
was yes. If the First Amendment allows you to ban the film that
Citizens United produced from being broadcast on television, then
it could ban Simon and Schuster from publishing a book that said
the same thing.15
So, the question always was: what is the remedy to this problem
everybody is concerned about? Does the remedy achieve what it
claims to achieve? No. Does it make the situation better or worse?
It makes it worse. Does it create a whole other set of problems that
nobody anticipated, the way alcohol prohibition did? Yes, it does. It
creates a threat to the right of free speech.
And the main use of campaign finance laws, the main use over
the fifty years that they have been in existence—since before
Buckley—the main use has been to try to restrict the speech of notfor-profit cause organizations. It has never successfully stopped
people like the Koch brothers or Stewart Mott or George Soros. I
mean, George Soros spent twenty-seven million dollars in 2004 on
13
14
15
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this kind of advocacy.16 Did you hear a single liberal ever complain
about that?
People in this country have always been supporters of free
speech, so long as it was their own. And that is the lesson of what
has now become the liberal dilemma. People of zeal, well
intentioned, concerned about inequality of speech, which is a valid
concern, and so blinded by it that they have supported remedies that,
if they are successful, will destroy them. The Nation magazine came
out for a Constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens United.17
What that would require if they were successful would be rewriting
the First Amendment. Who do you think is going to get injured by
that? It is not going to be the Koch brothers. It is going to be The
Nation magazine and people like them.
So, this is wrongheaded. It is the kind of mistake that we made
with alcohol prohibition. It is the kind of mistake we made with the
drug war. And it has been the dominant liberal mistake in
Constitutional rights for almost half a century now. And if there is a
lesson to be learned by looking back to the Buckley v. Valeo
decision, that is the lesson.
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